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ADDRESSING THREE PROBLEMS IN
COMMENTARY ON CATHOLICS AT THE
SUPREME COURT BY REFERENCE TO
THREE DECADES OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS'
AMICus BRIEFS
Kevin C. Walsh*
Much commentary about Catholic Justices serving on the Supreme Court
suffers from three related shortcomings: (1) episodic, one-case-at-a-time
commentary; (2) asymmetric causal attributions resulting from inattention to
cases in which Catholic Justices vote for outcomes opposite those advocated by
the Catholic Bishops' Conference; and (3) inattention to broader jurisprudential
and ideological factors. This article uses an overlooked resource to identify and
counteract these shortcomings. It assesses the votes of the Justices-Catholic and
non-Catholic alike-in the full set of cases from the Rehnquist Court and the
Roberts Court (through June 2014) in which the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops filed an amicus curiae brief. By opening up critical
consideration of the Catholic Justices within a wider set of cases, this Article
raises more questions than it answers. But the first step toward getting better
answers is to ask better questions.
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INTRODUCTION
Catholics have commanded a majority on the Supreme Court since early
2006 when Justice Alito joined the Court as its fifth sitting Catholic Justice.]
The Court's Catholic ranks swelled to a supermajority in August 2009 when
Justice Sotomayor ascended to the Court.2 These developments have resulted in
plenty of commentary over the past several years linking the religious identity
of the Catholic Justices with their votes and opinions. This commentary will
continue as long as there are enough Catholics on the Supreme Court to make a
difference in how cases turn out.
There are three principal problems with much of this commentary. First, it
pops up-and will continue to pop up-in the same way that the Supreme
Court decides cases: one case at a time. As a result, commentary on Catholic
Justices voting for the outcome supported by the Catholics bishops in an
abortion case, for example, is not linked to commentary on Catholic Justices
voting against the outcome supported by the Catholic bishops in a death
penalty case. And the commentary on Catholic Justices votingfor the outcome
supported by the Catholic bishops in the contraceptives mandate cases will not
be linked to commentary on Catholic Justices voting against the outcome
supported by the Catholic bishops in deciding on a constitutional right to same-
sex marriage.
Second, there is a curious asymmetry in causal attributions. It is not
deemed news- or noteworthy that Catholic Justices sometimes vote against
outcomes advocated by Catholic bishops. And yet commentators somehow
think it plausible to assert that when these Justices vote for an outcome
supported by the Catholic bishops, they do so because they are Catholics. For
example, if Justice Kennedy votes to uphold a ban on partial-birth abortion, he
does so because he is a Catholic; but if he votes to find a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage, he does so despite being a Catholic. This asymmetry was
on display most recently when some commentary used Justice Sotomayor's
Catholic background to explain her grant of an injunction to protect the Little
Sisters of the Poor from the contraceptives mandate, while coverage of her
1. Robert F. Drinan, Catholics on the Supreme Court: The Jury Is Out on Chief
Justice John Roberts, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Sept. 8, 2006, at 15, available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Catholics+on+the+Supreme+Court%3a+the+jury+is+out+on
+Justice+John...-a0151842970.
2. See Robert Barnes & Jennifer Agiesta, Poll Affirms a Vote for Judicial Know-How,
WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/04/29/AR2010042904893.html.
412 [Vol. 26:411
COMMENTS ON CATHOLICS
dissent from a different injunction regarding the same mandate focused on her
gender rather than her religious background.3
Third, this commentary tends to ignore the legal and ideological coherence
of the particular Justices' votes considered apart from their identity as
Catholics. Justice Scalia's votes in abortion and death-penalty cases are
explained by similar jurisprudential commitments that align him with the
Bishops' Conference's position in one set of cases and against their position in
the other. The same may be said of Justice Kennedy's votes in death-penalty
and same-sex-marriage cases, to pick another example. Academic attitud-
inalists, who view Justices' votes as a function of the Justices' attitudes,
attribute little significance to religion as an ideological variable. Yet armchair
attitudinalists nevertheless insist on ecclesial affiliation as explanatory.
This Article addresses these problems in a new way. It assesses the
relationship between the religious identity of the Catholic Justices and their
votes in Catholic-salient cases by drawing on an overlooked resource setting
forth an institutional Catholic position in a wide range of cases-the Supreme
Court filings of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. The
Bishops' Conference is a corporate body that includes all the Catholic bishops
in the United States and speaks on matters of public importance, such as the
relationship between morality and law. 4 The Conference's briefs supply the
closest thing one can find to the Catholic position on questions of constitutional
law, but it is important to note at the outset that there is no such thing. To be
clear: there is no "Catholic answer" to questions of federal constitutional law
(or any questions of federal law, for that matter). There is, for example, a
Catholic teaching about the morality of the death penalty.5 But there is no
Catholic teaching about the legal meaning of the Eighth Amendment. There is,
to pick another example, a Catholic teaching about the necessity for the Church
to have the freedom to be a Church: to administer sacraments and to gather the
People of God.6 But there is no Catholic teaching about the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. And so on. When bringing
3. Compare Jamie Stiehm, The Catholic Supreme Court's War on Women, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/jamie-
stiehm/2014/01/07/the-catholic-supreme-courts-war-on-women (using Justice Sotomayor's
Catholic identity to explain her grant of an injunction against the contraceptive mandate),
with Brett Logiurato, Female Justices Issue Scathing Dissent In the First Post-Hobby Lobby
Birth Control Exemption, Bus. INSIDER (July 3, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/
sotomayor-ginsburg-kagan-dissent-wheaton-college-decision-supreme-court-2014-7 (emph-
asizing Justice Sotomayor's gender while discussing her dissent from a different injunction
against the contraceptive mandate).
4. See, e.g., Brief of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1-2, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do
Vegetal, 544 U.S. 973 (2005) (No. 04-1084); see also THOMAS J. REESE, A FLOCK OF
SHEPHERDS: THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS vii, 187-88 (1992).
5. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶i 2268-69 (Ignatius Press, 1994).
6. Pope Paul VI, Declaration on Religious Liberty: Dignitatis Humanae, in VATICAN
COUNCIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 799, 800 (Laurence Ryan
trans., Costello Publ'g Co. new rev. ed. 1992).
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Catholic teaching to bear on questions of federal law before the Supreme Court
of the United States, the Bishops' Conference makes prudential, strategic,
tactical, and legal judgments in deciding whether to file a brief and what to
include in it.7
Even while affirming that there is no single "Catholic answer" to questions
of federal law, it is important not to overemphasize this point. Catholic social
teaching guides the Bishops' Conference's amicus briefs, and all of these briefs
ask the Court to implement the insights of that teaching in some way.
Moreover, it is hard to imagine the Bishops' Conference weighing in on the
opposite side of most of the cases in which they file. Take, for instance, a case
involving the constitutionality of a capital sentence or a law restricting
abortion. As a potential amicus curiae, the Conference's principal decision is
whether to file or not. In these cases, there is little doubt what outcome the
Conference would advocate in any contemplated filing. When filing on
something like immigration law, by contrast, the Bishops' Conference's
judgment about what side to support is likely to be more heavily influenced by
prudential considerations relating to which particular governmental actors and
policies are more likely to align more consistently with Catholic social thought.
The Bishops' Conference does not file an amicus curiae brief in every case
in which Catholic social teaching has something to say about the subject
matter. But every case in which the Conference has filed an amicus curiae brief
is one such case. And considering these cases as a group provides a way of
getting beyond the single-issue focus that too often results from the episodic
way in which questions about the relationship between religious faith and role
fidelity typically arise with respect to Catholic Justices. Taking these as a
group, one can also see that virtually every Catholic Justice now on the Court
has voted against the outcome advocated by the Bishops' Conference at least
once (Chief Justice Roberts is currently the sole exception). By comparing the
majority-Catholic Roberts Court to the Rehnquist Court, which included both
non-Catholic conservatives like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Catholic liberals
like Justice Brennan, one can see that the high rate of agreement between the
Catholic Justices and the Bishops' Conference during the Roberts Court is
largely a function of ideology rather than ecclesial affiliation. And one can also
see how the Justices' votes in cases in which the Bishops' Conference has
participated as amicus curiae make sense given the Justices' broader
ideological and legal commitments. Their identity as Catholics may have
shaped those commitments in some way, but one does not need to look through
or underneath those commitments to explain the Justices' votes. In short, this
Article's identification and exploration of areas of consonance and dissonance
at the level of outcome in the cases in which the Bishops' Conference
participated as amicus curiae provides a new and useful way to examine
complex matters about which too many simplistic observations have too often
been made.
7. See REESE, supra note 4, at 215-17.
414 [Vol. 26:411
COMMENTS ON CATHOLICS
This Article has three parts. Part I locates the Catholic Justices in recent
popular and academic commentary and reveals the three problems highlighted
above. Part II examines the votes of the Justices (Catholic and non-Catholic
alike) in cases in which the Bishops' Conference filed an amicus curiae brief
over an approximately thirty-year period that begins with the opening of the
Rehnquist Court and ends with the October 2013 Term of the Roberts Court.
Part III analyzes the results of Part II's assessment in light of the distinctive and
limited roles of both the Bishops' Conference and the Catholic Justices.
I. THE CATHOLIC JUSTICES IN CONTEMPORARY COMMENTARY
One knock on American Catholics historically has been the suspicion that
they do not think for themselves, a suspicion reinforced by the hierarchical
nature of the institutional Church and the initially uncertain position of
American Catholics in public life. This suspicion has had less purchase over
time, but still lingers in some quarters. Indeed, some continue to express a
version of this suspicion with respect to the six Catholic Justices now on the
Supreme Court of the United States when some salient issue or case brings the
Catholic Justices' religious identity to the fore.
When Justice Sotomayor granted temporary injunctive relief in response to
an emergency application filed by the Little Sisters of the Poor, for example,
many news reports noted that Justice Sotomayor is Catholic. 9 In a U.S. News
and World Report posting titled, "The Catholic Supreme Court's War on
Women," one particularly strident commentator explicitly asserted that
Sotomayor "is a Catholic who put her religion ahead of her jurisprudence."' 0
This commentator went on to speculate that "[tihe seemingly innocent Little
Sisters likely were . . . not acting alone in their trouble-making."I Instead, they
were acting in cahoots with (or maybe under the direct control of) "[t]heir big
brothers, the meddlesome American Roman Catholic Archbishops," who "seek
and wield tremendous power and influence in the political sphere."' 2 While this
kind of direct accusation is rare and may not be widely embraced, one wonders
sometimes whether elite journalists like Linda Greenhouse of the New York
Times subscribe to a version of this view. Consider her recent commentary
criticizing "sustained aggressiveness by religious groups that sense weakness in
8. See MARK S. MASSA, ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA: THE LAST ACCEPTABLE
PREJUDICE 12 (2003) (describing an "intellectualist reading of American cultural roots"
according to which "the common cultural faith was rooted in profoundly egalitarian,
rationalist presuppositions about the world, and anti-authoritarian impulses against which the
Catholic tradition appeared to many as an easy target").
9. See Stiehm, supra note 3.
10. Id.
I1. Id.
12. Id.
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the executive branch and welcoming arms at the Roberts Court." 1 3 Is it reading
too much into the subtext of this commentary to wonder whether it is a
coincidence that Greenhouse asserts there that "[t]he church plays a long
game?"l 4 That is the same phrase she has used to describe the judicial approach
of Chief Justice Roberts-he of the "welcoming arms."15
There is no need to wonder about other claims. Consider, for example,
National Public Radio ("NPR") commentator Diane Rehm's question for a
lawyer from the National Women's Law Center in a program discussing how
the Supreme Court might evaluate religious freedom objections to the federal
government's contraceptives mandate: "[H]ow many Roman Catholics now sit
on the Supreme Court, Judy?"16 The implied premise, of course, is that a
majority-Catholic institution would support religious-freedom objections rooted
in Catholicism. That's what Catholics do.
NPR listeners are an educated group. But most of them would have no idea
that a Catholic, Justice Scalia, wrote the principal Supreme Court decision
standing in the way of an easy win on a Free Exercise challenge to the
contraceptives mandate.17 Nor would many know that all three Catholics then
on the Court voted to hold unconstitutional, as applied to state and local
governments, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act that Congress passed in
response to that Scalia-authored Supreme Court decision.
Legal scholars might know both of these facts about Free Exercise Clause
doctrine. But many of them harbor doubts about how at least some of the
Catholic Justices operate at the intersection of religious faith and role fidelity.
Although often uncommonly articulate, legal academics have been known to
utter some real doozies in unguarded moments-as discussed below-usually
when making comments in passing that they might not wish to defend
critically.
The truth is that most people are just confused. While many have noted the
abundance of Catholics on the Supreme Court of the United States, most are at
a loss for what to think about this phenomenon. What does a Justice's religious
identity as a Catholic imply about that Justice's votes on legal issues,
particularly those about which there is clear Catholic moral teaching? The
American public is episodically interested in-and consistently confused
about-this question. And the same observation can be made about large
segments of the legal academy.
13. Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., The Stories We Tell, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/opinion/greenhouse-the-stories-we-tell.html?_r-0.
14. Id.
15. See Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., A Justice in Chief, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (June
28, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/a-justice-in-chief.
16. Catholics, Contraception and the New Health Care Law, THE DIANE REHM SHOW
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-02-02/catholics-contraception-and-
new-health-care-law/transcript.
17. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
18. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Puzzlement persists, in part, because of an inchoate sense that the influence
of a Justice's religion is something that should not be discussed too openly or
probed too thoroughly. Journalistic observers have occasionally given voice to
the unease induced by this sense, realizing the need to say something about
religious identity while not knowing quite what to say. For example, a
Washington Post article previewing the potential retirement of Justice Stevens
in 2010 began: "Here's the kind of question that might violate the rules you
learned about proper dinner conversation: Does President Obama's next
Supreme Court nominee need to be a Protestant?" 1 9 Nina Totenberg's story for
NPR began by highlighting the "hint of taboo" surrounding the subject of the
Justices' religious identities.20 "Let's face it," Totenberg stated, "[t]his is a
radioactive subject."21 Author and historian Jeff Shesol noted that "religion is
the third rail of Supreme Court politics. It's not something that's talked about in
polite company."22 Shesol observed that, although people talk privately "about
the surprising fact that there are so many Catholics on the Supreme Court, this
is not a subject that people openly discuss."23 In the same story, political
scientist Henry Abraham declared that discussing a nominee's religious identity
"would certainly raise a lot of eyebrows."24 If the subject were to be directly
investigated as part of a confirmation hearing, Abraham suspected that "all hell
would break loose," and that he "cannot imagine that being brought up openly."
Covertly, perhaps in some ways-but it's a highly delicate problem."25 Indeed,
as Adam Liptak noted in the New York Times, the topic of a Justice's religious
identity "seems to make people uncomfortable on the rare occasions it is
raised."26
The inhibitions that keep discussion suppressed are occasionally overcome,
as when a five-justice Catholic majority voted against a four-justice non-
Catholic minority to uphold the federal ban on partial-birth abortions in
19. Robert Barnes, High Court: Does Religion Still Matter?, WASH. POST (Mar. 8,
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/07/AR20100307027
05.html. The bounds of propriety for dinner conversation apparently do not extend to
pollsters (although if they call at dinner, they might not get much of a response). Seventy
percent of respondents to a Fox News poll indicated that it did not matter to them if there
were no Protestants on the bench. Eighty percent of respondents to a Washington Post/ABC
News poll said it was not important to them whether the nominee to replace Justice Stevens
is a woman, an African American, or a Protestant. See Barnes & Agiesta, supra note 2.
20. Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court May Soon Lack Protestant Justices, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 7, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld
=125641988.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Adam Liptak, Stevens, the Only Protestant on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/l l/weekinreview/ IIliptak.html? (stating,
in the course of a discussion of Justice Stevens as the lone Protestant on the Supreme Court,
that "religion, which once mattered deeply, has fallen out of the conversation").
2015] 417
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Gonzales v. Carhart.27 Both lowbrow and highbrow commentary trotted out
the claim that the Catholic Justices were voting their religion rather than their
best view of the law, and some of this commentary traded on the long-festering
suspicion that Catholics do not think for themselves. The Philadelphia Inquirer
ran a cartoon that depicted the Court's Catholic Justices wearing bishop's
miters:
CHOPCR STATE.
And on ABC's "The View," Rosie O'Donnell railed against the ruling,
eventually arriving at the same point as the cartoonist:
O'DONNELL: You know what concerns me? How many Supreme Court
judges are Catholic, Barbara?
WALTERS: Five.
O'DONNELL: Five. How about separation of church and state in America? 28
A more refined presentation of a similar worry emerged from the legal
academy. Professor Geoffrey Stone of the University of Chicago Law School
suggested in an op-ed that the five Catholic Justices in the Gonzales v. Carhart
majority failed to respect the critical line between their personal religious
27. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
28. See Catholic League, Cartoon Guilty of Anti-Catholicism, CATALYST ONLINE (June
2007), http://www.catholicleague.org/cartoon-guilty-of-anti-catholicism (providing copy of
and information about the cartoon); see also Patrick Archbold, Catholics in the Crosshairs-
Update, CREATIVE MINORITY REP. (Apr. 20, 2007, 12:34 PM), http://www.
creativeminorityreport.com/2007_04_15_archive.html (quoting this interchange). Barbara
Walters pushed back, invoking each Justice's assertions during their confirmation hearings
that he would not vote a particular way because he is Catholic. Id. Presumably, this did not
persuade Ms. O'Donnell.
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beliefs and their responsibilities as jurists.29 In a later commentary revisiting
the topic, however, Stone retreated from his position and struck a more
tentative note, stating that Gonzales v. Carhart raises "interesting questions
about whether and to what extent judges are and should be influenced by their
religion, their ethnic background, their race, their life experiences, and their
personal values."3 0
More recently, the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby became a flashpoint for discussion of the Catholic Justices on the
Supreme Court. The Freedom From Religion Foundation took out a full-page
advertisement in the New York Times proclaiming "All-Male All-Roman
Catholic Majority on Supreme Court Puts Religious Wrongs Over Women's
Rights."31 Cardinal Timothy Dolan of the Archdiocese of New York responded
by describing the advertisement as an example of anti-Catholic prejudice: "[I]n
keeping with a long, shadowy legacy of antipathy, justices who happen to be
Catholics-never mind their past frequent votes hardly consonant with the
public teaching of their faith-are branded and bullied by a group who only
succeed in providing the latest example of a prejudice that has haunted us for
centuries." 32
Like Gonzales v. Carhart, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby simply provided
another high-3 rofile occasion for expression of a suspicion of Catholics in
public office. But this suspicion is sometimes expressed unprompted by any
particular decision of the Supreme Court. At the conclusion of his review of a
book about the original understanding of the Establishment Clause, for
example, legal historian Scot Powe suggests that five Catholic Justices might
one day rely on the book under review "with or without citation" in
implementing "a Catholic interpretation of the Establishment Clause." 34 This
passing reference to the possibility of a religiously motivated shaping of the
law is similar to an earlier assertion made by Ronald Dworkin, who in 2008
described the five Catholic Justices then on the Court as a "right-wing phalanx"
29. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Faith-Based Justices, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 30, 2007),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-04-30/news/0704290277I lpartial -birth-four-
justices-abortions.
30. Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Scalia and Our Six Catholic
Justices, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-
stone/justice-sotomayor-justice-b_271229.html.
31. See FRFF's Full-Page Ad in New York Times to Protest Hobby Lobby Ruling,
FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND. (July 2, 2014), http://ffrf.org/news/news-
releases/item/20870-ffrf-s-full-page-ad-in-new-york-times-to-protest-hobby-lobby-ruling
("The Supreme Court's ultra-conservative, Roman Catholic majority . . . has sided with
zealous fundamentalists who equate contraception with abortion.").
32. Timothy M. Dolan, Thank You, FFRF, CATHOLIC NEW YORK (July 3, 2014),
http://cny.org/stories/Thank-You-FFRF,l 1266.
33. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
34. Scot Powe, Robes and Vestments, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 13, 2010),
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/robes-and-vestments.
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that "seems guided by no judicial or political principle at all, but only by
partisan, cultural, and perhaps religious allegiance." 35
These glancing comments and passing observations do not amount to
much. The academic observers, at least, offer observations that are tentative
and undeveloped, and they express a commitment to open-mindedness.
Discussing Stone's claim about Gonzales v. Carhart, for example, Powe
observes: "Perhaps Stone was correct in his correlation of public jurisprudence
with private faith, although evidence is hard to come by."36
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., a senior Ninth Circuit judge and legal historian
who has written extensively on the development of Catholic moral teaching,
has provided the most sensitive account to date of the influence of Catholic
identity on the decisions of Catholic Supreme Court Justices. Judge Noonan
concludes from his own research and reflection that "in the course of 170 years
of Catholics on the Supreme Court, it does not appear that the identification of
a Justice as a Catholic carries with it predictive value as to his vote." 37 A
similar conclusion about the absence of a generalizable, predictive influence of
religious identity could be drawn, Noonan asserts, from an examination of the
constitutional decision making of the Jewish Justices: Louis Brandeis,
Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, Arthur Goldberg, Abe Fortas, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan.38 According to Noonan, "if
Catholic or Jewish Justices had been as numerous as Episcopalian Justices, the
idea that the Catholic's religion predicted his vote would have died long
ago."39
Noonan's historical observations also find resonance in contemporary
journalistic observations. As more Catholics have joined the Court, observers
have recognized the differences among them and embraced the conclusion that
each Justice's Catholic identity affects him or her in different ways. For
example, a New York Times article on the relationship between Justice
Sotomayor's religious identity and her approach to judging bore the headline
"Sotomayor Would Be Sixth Catholic Justice, but the Pigeonholing Ends
35. RONALD DWORKIN, THE SUPREME COURT PHALANX: THE COURT'S NEW RIGHT-
WING BLOc 47-48 (2008).
36. Powe, supra note 34.
37. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Religion of the Justice: Does It Affect Constitutional
Decision Making?, 42 TULSA L. REv. 761, 764 (2006). This written adaptation of Judge
Noonan's Constitution Day lecture expanded on the research that then-Professor Noonan set
forth twenty-five years earlier in John T. Noonan, Jr., The Catholic Justices of the United
States Supreme Court, 67 CATH. HIST. REV. 369, 369 (July 1981).
38. See Noonan, The Religion of the Justice, supra note 37, at 764 ("I doubt that one
could find a single tenet of Judaism that played a decisive part in their decisions. As
individuals, who could have been more different in their approach to judging than Brandeis
and Fortas or than Cardozo and Frankfurter?"). Extending the point even further, "[n]o one
has suggested that there is an Episcopalian or Presbyterian color to any Court's decision." Id.
39. Id. at 765.
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There."40 The article quoted law and theology professor M. Cathleen Kaveny
that there is no "'one Catholic stance on the law,' . .. 'Catholicism is a big tent,
so different people are drawn to different aspects of it. A Dorothy Day Catholic
is going to be different than an Opus Dei Catholic."' 4 1
The absence of any general effect of Catholicism on Catholic Justices need
not exclude the presence of particularized effects. And it is these effects, not
some general orientation, that critics worry about. They worry that a Justice-
because he or she is Catholic-will tilt toward a "Catholic answer" to a
particular legal issue (such as the moral status of an embryo, fetus, or baby in
utero). 42
The challenge in assessing this worry is to get beyond soupy descriptive
"realism." It is true, but trivial, to observe that the Justices are human; that they
have passions, predilections, and "can't helps"; that their outlook on life is
shaped by a welter of forces and beliefs, including religious beliefs; and that
their votes in cases cannot help but reflect their outlook on life. These
observations provide little guidance in identifying influences on judicial
behavior, which may depart from what one might assume from assessing a
judge's outlook on life divorced from the specifically legal filters that the judge
has shaped, and that have shaped that judge, over time.
Empirical studies and statistical analyses conducted to date provide helpful
but limited insight. In particular, studies of lower court judges have found that
religious background provides a robust and salient correlation with outcomes in
certain kinds of religious liberty cases. 43 But these findings cannot be (or at
least, have not been) extrapolated to other kinds of cases. Nor are they
transferable to the Supreme Court, which makes sense given the small number
of Justices and the small number of cases that raise worries about undue
40. Laurie Goodstein, Sotomayor Would Be Sixth Catholic Justice, but the
Pigeonholing Ends There, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
05/31/us/politics/31catholics.html.
41. Id. Simultaneously illustrating and addressing the lack of public knowledge (by
Catholics and non-Catholics alike) of the many strands of American Catholic religious
identity, the article explains, parenthetically, that "Dorothy Day founded the Catholic
Worker movement that promotes justice for the poor; Opus Dei is a church prelature that
promotes personal orthodoxy." Id. The article also quotes Reverend Joseph O'Hare, "a Jesuit
priest and the former president of Fordham University, who came to know Judge Sotomayor
when they both served on the New York City Campaign Finance Board in the 1980s," who
commented: "I just don't think Sonia would fit in with Roberts, exactly, and certainly not
Scalia. I think they're very different Catholics." Id.
42. With respect to the terminological objection that many readers may have at this
point, see John Finnis, The Other F-Word, PUB. DISCOURSE (Oct. 20, 2010),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/10/1849.
43. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491,
491 (2004); see also Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Ideology "All the Way Down"?: An
Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 1201 (2012).
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religious influence.4 4 Attitudinalist and strategic decisionmaking accounts of
Supreme Court Justices' votes have not, to date, assigned much significance to
religious background.4 5 One exception is a recent statistical study of the
Catholic Justices' votes between 1953 and 2008 by William Blake, which
concludes that "[aicross a wide range of legal issues, it appears that the
Catholic variable plays a role in judicial decision making independent of
ideology." 46 The biggest religion-specific effects identified in this study
occurred in the abortion, Establishment Clause, and Free Exercise areas, while
effects were smaller in other areas. 47 This makes sense given that some of the
other hypothesized effects tested by the study's statistical analyses relate to
areas in which Catholic social teaching provides only the most general
guidance about the appropriate role of law in implementing that teaching. 48
When considering the correlation of "public jurisprudence and private
faith" for the Catholic Justices, then, Powe was right that "evidence is hard to
come by."49 Fortunately, however, there is an illuminating set of cases that has
been largely overlooked: those cases in which United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops filed an amicus curiae brief. The next section examines the
Justices' votes in those cases beginning with the Rehnquist Court and
continuing through the October 2013 term of the Roberts Court.
II. THE BISHOPS' CONFERENCE AND THE CATHOLIC JUSTICES ON THE
REHNQUIST AND EARLY ROBERTS COURTS
The advent of the Rehnquist Court in 1986 is a useful point at which to
begin an assessment of how Catholic and non-Catholic Justices voted in cases
in which the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops filed an amicus
brief. Justice Scalia joined the Court then, both doubling and diversifying the
Court's Catholic presence, which immediately before then consisted only of
Justice Brennan. Over the course of the Rehnquist Court, the number of
Catholics on the nine-Justice Supreme Court moved from two (William
Brennan and Antonin Scalia) to three (when Anthony Kennedy replaced Lewis
Powell) to four (when Clarence Thomas replaced Thurgood Marshall), and then
44. See Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision
Making: An Empirical Perspective, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 185, 191 (2012) ("[O]wing to the
small and stable number of justices serving on the Court, we find that empirical studies of
the members of that unique institution sometimes migrate from social science to
biography.").
45. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
46. William Blake, God Save This Honorable Court: Religion as a Source of Judicial
Policy Preferences, 65 POL. REs. Q. 814, 820 (Dec. 2012).
47. See id. at 822 tbl. 3.
48. It is true, for example, that "the Second Vatican Council in 1965 took a strong
stance against racial and gender discrimination." Id. at 818. But Catholic social teaching
does not provide significant guidance about how that stance is to be operationalized in law.
49. Powe, supra note 34.
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back down to three (when David Souter replaced William Brennan). 50 The
Roberts Court began in October Term 2005, when John Roberts began to
preside as Chief Justice. In the first few years of the Roberts Court, the number
of Catholics on the Court increased from three (Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas) to four (when John Roberts replaced William
Rehnquist) to five (when Samuel Alito replaced Sandra Day O'Connor) to six
(when Sonia Sotomayor replaced David Souter). One can, of course, only
speculate when the next change in Court composition will be and how that
might affect the Catholic nose-count.
During the twenty-eight year period from the beginning of the Rehnquist
Court in 1986 term through the October 2013 Term, the Bishops' Conference
filed an amicus curiae brief in thirty-two cases. An examination of the extent to
which the Justices voted for the outcome advocated by the Bishops'
Conference in these cases allows for a crude comparison among the Justices,
placing them in an array of more or less agreement with the outcomes sought
by the Bishops' Conference. A direct comparison of Justices cannot be made
because the Court's changing composition over time results in different
numbers of cases voted on by each of the Justices. Moreover, a Justice's
agreement with the outcome advocated by the Bishops' Conference does not
mean agreement with the Bishops' Conference's reasoning or even that the
Justices reached the specific issue addressed by the Bishops' Conference..
A. The Rehnquist Court
We begin with the Rehnquist Court. During this time, the Bishops'
Conference filed amicus curiae briefs in twenty-two cases. Ten of the briefs
dealt with religious liberty (encompassing statutory, Free Exercise, and
Establishment Clause cases);51 six addressed abortion; 52 three were about end-
of-life issues; 53 two involved the death penalty; 54 and one addressed
50. This timeline is a little simplified. Clarence Thomas was raised Roman Catholic,
but he attended an Episcopalian church at the time of his nomination, returning to
Catholicism in the mid-1990s. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 45, at 183 n.1 7.
51. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004);
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
(plurality opinion); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
52. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
53. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
54. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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associational freedom.5 5 Table I shows the rate of agreement between the
outcomes supported by each Justice's vote and that supported by the Bishops'
Conference, along with the raw numbers of total cases and total outcome-
agreeing votes. 56
Table 1: Justices' Agreement with the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops
Agreement with
Bishops' Conference
as Percentage of
Cases
Agreement with
Bishops'
Conference as
Fraction of Cases
Justice White 100% 10/10
Justice Scalia (Cath.) 86% 19/22
Justice Kennedy (Cath.) 86% 18/21
Chief Justice Rehnquist 82% 18/22
Justice Thomas (Cath.) 79% 11/14
Justice O'Connor 77% 17/22
Justice Breyer 58% 7/12
Justice Souter 53% 8/15
Justice Brennan (Cath.) 43% 3/7
Justice Ginsburg 42% 5/12
Justice Stevens 36% 8/22
Justice Blackmun 20% 2/10
Justice Marshall 13% 1/8
These numbers show that six Justices voted for the outcome advocated by
the Bishops more than three-fourths of the time. That group is split evenly
between Catholics and non-Catholics. Three of the Court's four Catholic
Justices voted with the Bishops more than three-fourths of the time. The fourth
Catholic Justice, William Brennan, voted with the Bishops in fewer than one-
half of the cases.
55. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
56. The table does not include Justice Powell, who only participated in one case in
which the Bishops' Conference filed an amicus curiae brief during this time.
424 [Vol. 26:411
COMMENTS ON CATHOLICS
The low rate of agreement between Justice Brennan and the Bishops'
Conference is notable given that Justice Brennan was the last beneficiary of a
so-called "Catholic seat" on the Supreme Court.57 And Justice Brennan's
voting pattern presents an interesting contrast with Justice White's. The
contrast is noteworthy because President Kennedy appointed White. As the
country's first (and thus far only) Catholic President, Kennedy could not
politically afford to nominate a Catholic to the Supreme Court. 58 By contrast,
Brennan's Catholicism was an important factor in making him an attractive
nominee for Eisenhower.59 Thus, one reason that Brennan was appointed is that
he was a Catholic, while one reason White was appointed is that he was not a
Catholic. Yet White ended up consistently voting with the Catholic bishops on
the Rehnquist Court, while Justice Brennan had one of the lowest rates of
agreement during the same time period.
The Bishops' Conference filed amicus briefs in seven cases that both
Justices Brennan and White voted on during the Rehnquist Court. These
Justices agreed with each other and with the Bishops' Conference in two of
those cases.60 In the remaining five cases, they voted on opposite sides- White
with the Bishops' Conference and Brennan against. Those cases involved end-
of-life medical treatment,61 parental notification for a minor's abortion, 62
various other regulations placing limits on abortion,63 and the constitutionality
of federal funding for adolescent sexuality and pregnancy-related services
performed by religiously affiliated and other organizations.6 The distinction
between a Catholic Justice, on the one hand, and a Justice whose votes accord
with those sought by the Bishops' Conference, on the other, emerges in high
relief.
Indeed, Justice White-not a Catholic-agreed with the Bishops'
Conference in every Rehnquist Court case in which the Conference filed an
57. See Barbara A. Perry, The Life and Death of the "Catholic Seat" on the United
States Supreme Court, 6 J.L. & POL. 55, 83-85 (1989).
58. See DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 75 (1999) ("During the 1960 campaign[,]
Kennedy had weathered charges that as the first Catholic president his allegiance would be
split between the interests of America and those of the politically powerful Catholic Church.
Clearly Kennedy wanted to avoid naming a fellow Catholic to this first vacancy."). Yalof
also observed that Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer, who had been included on
a list of potential nominees drawn up by Theodore Sorenson, "received short shrift in the
discussion . . . because he had been born Catholic." Id. at 78-79.
59. See id. at 55; see also PETER H. IRONS, BRENNAN VS. REHNQUIST: THE BATTLE FOR
THE CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1994).
60. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Corp.
of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987).
61. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
62. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
63. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
64. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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amicus brief, leaving him with the highest rate of agreement. Yet this
observation highlights a limitation of the comparisons in the table. As the third
column reveals, Justice White participated in less than half of the cases
involving the Bishops' Conference that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia participated in throughout this entire time period. In the ten cases in
which Justice White participated, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
also had a 100% agreement rate with the Bishops' Conference.65 This group of
three Justices with a 100% agreement rate in these ten cases had one Catholic
and two non-Catholics. 66
Justices Scalia and Thomas had a high rate of agreement with the Bishops'
Conference during the Rehnquist Court. These two justices had identical voting
records in the fourteen cases that they both voted on in which the Bishops'
Conference filed an amicus brief.67 Notwithstanding the substantial attention
often paid to abortion cases, however, just two of these fourteen cases involved
abortion.68 An equal number involved the death penalty, and Justices Scalia69and Thomas voted against the Bishops' Conference in both. Indeed, no
Justice has been more explicitly critical of current Catholic teaching on the
death penalty than Justice Scalia has.70 In one dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia
directly criticized the Bishops' Conference, questioning the organization's
decision to lay claim to authority to discern evolving standards of decency.71
65. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990);
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497
U.S. 502 (1990); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990);
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
(1988); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
66. Justice Kennedy voted in nine of the ten Bishops' Conference cases that Justice
White voted in, agreeing with the Bishops' Conference eight of nine times (with Planned
Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), as the exception).
67. See Table 1. Justice Scalia had a higher rate of agreement than Justice Thomas
because he voted on eight cases in which the Bishops' Conference filed an amicus brief that
were decided before Justice Thomas joined the Court. Justice Scalia voted with the Bishops'
Conference in all eight of those cases.
68. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505
U.S. at 833 (plurality opinion).
69. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the execution of
juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(holding that the execution of mentally retarded offenders violates the Eighth Amendment).
70. See Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS (May 2002),
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2002/05/gods-justice-and-ours.
71. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322, 347 n.6 (criticizing the Court's reliance on
"the views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls" and singling out
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops by noting that "[t]he attitudes of that body
regarding crime and punishment are so far from being representative, even of the views of
Catholics, that they are currently the object of intense national (and entirely ecumenical)
criticism"). The not-so-subtle referent is, of course, the then-emerging criticism of the
Bishops' handling of sexually abusive priests.
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Half of the fourteen cases involved either the Establishment Clause (four
cases) 72 or the Free Exercise Clause (three cases). 73 Justices Scalia and Thomas
voted with the Bishops' Conference in all four Establishment Clause cases,
loosening restrictions on the flow of government funds and services to religious
institutions. 74 They also voted with the Bishops' Conference in two out of three
Free Exercise cases, 75 although these numbers mask an important rift over the
scope of Free Exercise doctrine.
In 1990, Justice Scalia authored the Court's opinion in Employment
Division v. Smith, which some have described as the greatest setback in decades
for religious freedom in the United States.76 The Bishops' Conference did not
file an amicus curiae brief in Smith, but that could be only because they-like
many others-might have viewed the case as calling for a relatively fact-bound
application of prior doctrine. The Bishops' Conference responded virtually
immediately when the Smith decision was handed down.77 Although avoiding
early endorsement of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") out of
concerns for potential effects that this legislation in response to Smith could
have on abortion cases, the Bishops' Conference eventually joined a coalition
of other groups to push for passage of the RFRA. The avowed purpose of the
RFRA was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in [two earlier
Supreme Court decisions] and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."
Justice Thomas had not yet joined the Court at the time of the 1990
decision in Smith. But he was on the Court when the constitutional validity of
the RFRA came before the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores. Both
Justices Thomas and Scalia joined the opinion of the Court holding the RFRA
unconstitutional. The only other Catholic then on the Court, Anthony
Kennedy, wrote the opinion for the Court. 8 1
City of Boerne is not the only-or even the most prominent-case in which
Justice Kennedy voted against a position advocated by the Bishops'
Conference. More than any other Justice currently on the Court, Justice
Kennedy is responsible for the persistence of the broad abortion right first
72. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
73. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
74. See cases cited supra note 72.
75. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 511; Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 523.
76. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
77. See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. I, 15 (1994).
78. Id.
79. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2013).
80. Flores, 521 U.S. at 509, 537.
81. Id. at 511.
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recognized in Roe v. Wade.82 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice Kennedy joined with Justices O'Connor and
Souter to reaffirm the "core holding" of Roe v. Wade.83 In later cases, Justice
Kennedy has sought to apply Casey in a way that provides government with
greater latitude to regulate abortion. 84 But in Casey itself, the opinion co-
authored by Justice Kennedy sets forth an understanding of liberty deeply at
odds with that embraced by the Bishops' Conference.
In sum, a review of the performance of the Catholic Justices on the
Rehnquist Court from the perspective of the Bishops' Conference shows a
decidedly mixed picture. Catholic identity did not prevent Justice Brennan from
voting for outcomes sought by the Bishops' Conference at a much lower rate
than other non-Catholic Justices. And Catholic Justices who more consistently
voted in favor of the outcomes sought by the Bishops' Conference disappointed
the hierarchs-often predictably so-on several important issues, including
abortion, capital punishment, and free exercise. Given the support received
from non-Catholics like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, the
Bishops' Conference would not have assessed its likely allies on the Rehnquist
Court by reference to their ecclesial affiliation. Like other careful
courtwatchers, the Bishops' Conference would have been much more attentive
to jurisprudential and ideological factors.
B. The Roberts Court Through October Term 2013
The transition to the Roberts Court marked a new era in commentary on
the Catholic Justices because the replacement of Chief Justice Rehnquist by
Chief Justice Roberts, followed shortly thereafter by the replacement of Justice
O'Connor with Justice Alito, brought the Court to a majority-Catholic
institution. In the first nine years of the Roberts Court (2005 term through 2013
term), the Bishops' Conference filed amicus curiae briefs in ten cases. Four of
the briefs dealt with religious liberty;85 two addressed abortion;86 two were
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837, 860 (1992) (plurality
opinon). At present, only three of the nine Justices who cast votes in Casey are still on the
Court. Justice Kennedy voted to reaffirm the core holding of Roe v. Wade. Id. Justices Scalia
and Thomas dissented. Id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
84. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000).
85. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012); Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011); Christian
Legal Soc'y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 544 U.S. 973 (2005).
86. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N.
New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
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about same-sex marriage; one was about assisted suicide; and one
addressed a cluster of issues surrounding immigration. 89 Because the Court
decided one of these ten cases, Hollingsworth v. Perry, on standing grounds
unrelated to the merits, the analysis that follows excludes this case. Although
the Court decided another of these cases, Arizona School Tuition Organization
v. Winn, on standing grounds, that case's Establishment-Clause-specific
standing reasoning is sufficiently related to the merits that it is included in the
analysis. The rate of agreement between the outcomes supported by each
Justices' vote and that supported by the Bishops' Conference in the remaining
nine cases, along with the raw numbers of total cases and total outcome-
agreeing votes, can be seen in Table 2 below:
Table 2: Justices' Agreement with the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops
Agreement
with
Bishops'
Conference
as Percentage
of Cases
Agreement
with
Bishops'
Conference
as Fraction
of Cases
Chief Justice Roberts (Cath.) 100% 9/9
Justice Scalia (Cath.) 89% 8/9
Justice Thomas (Cath.) 89% 8/9
Justice Alito (Cath.) 83% 5/6
Justice Kennedy (Cath.) 67% 6/9
Justice Stevens 50% 2/4
Justice Souter 50% 2/4
Justice O'Connor 50% 1/2
Justice Ginsburg 44% 4/9
Justice Breyer 44% 4/9
Justice Sotomayor (Cath.) 40% 2/5
Justice Kagan 25% 1/4
87. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652 (2013).
88. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
89. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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These statistics reveal a stark division between the Catholic and non-
Catholic Justices on the Roberts Court in the rate of outcome agreement with
the Bishops' Conference. The Chief Justice agreed with the Bishops'
Conference on the outcome in every case in which it filed a brief. Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito agreed in every case but one. And Justice Kennedy
agreed in six out of nine cases, or two-thirds of them. Of the Catholic Justices,
only Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Bishops' Conference less than half of
the time. By contrast, the six non-Catholic Justices agreed with the Bishops'
Conference in half the cases or fewer. The set of cases is, of course, small in
absolute terms. But there is every reason to believe that the divide they reveal
will hold steady for as long as the Court's population and the ideological
valence of the Bishops' Conference's filings remain the same.
While the difference between Catholics and non-Catholics in outcome
agreement with the Bishops' Conference is certainly notable, it is important to
recognize the limits of the measurement. As previously noted, a notation of
outcome agreement means only that the vote cast by a Justice was for a ruling
in favor of the same party as supported by the Bishops' Conference; it does not
necessarily mean even that a Justice voted for the same merits outcome
advocated by the Bishops' Conference. For example, in Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn, the Supreme Court ruled by a five-to-four
vote to dismiss an Establishment Clause challenge to a tax credit scheme that
provided significant funds to Catholic schools (among other private schools). 90
The five Catholic Justices in the majority voted to dismiss the case for lack of
standing, while the Bishops' Conference had advocated for a rejection of the
Establishment Clause challenge on its merits. 9 1 And even when Catholic
Justices voted for the same merits determination as that advocated by the
Bishops' Conference, the Justices did not necessarily do so for the same
reasons as those presented by the Bishops' Conference.
Notwithstanding the foregoing qualifications about the limited meaning of
the outcome-agreement numbers, the clustering of the Catholic Justices' votes
remains noteworthy. And if Justice Sotomayor or some other Catholic with
similar views had not joined the Court in 2009, the Catholic/non-Catholic
divide would be even more striking. Yet Justice Sotomayor's presence near the
bottom of the Bishops' Conference outcome-agreement chart also suggests that
something other than religious identity may explain how the Catholic Justices
vote in cases that the Bishops' Conference cares about.
That other explanatory factor is, of course, ideology. It is a striking fact of
the pre-Sotomayor Roberts Court that it featured a complete overlap of
Catholicism and conservatism. There were no conservative non-Catholics. Nor
90. 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442-48 (2011).
91. See Brief of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436
(2011) (Nos. 09-987, 09-991).
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were there any Catholics not on the more conservative end of the judicial
spectrum. The outcomes advocated by the Bishops' Conference in each of the
cases in which it filed an amicus curiae brief during this time were outcomes
more likely to be supported by conservatives. That does not mean that only
conservatives could support the advocated outcomes. Three of the cases, after
all, resulted in unanimous decisions.92 In the remaining cases resulting in split
decisions, however, the more conservative Justices on the Court agreed with
the Bishops' Conference. By contrast, the Conference was unable to attract the
votes of any of the non-Catholic Justices in these cases, none of whom could be
classified as conservatives.
III. THE COMPLEXITY OF CATHOLIC INFLUENCE
Let us now consider how reviewing the votes of the Catholic Justices in
cases in which the Bishops' Conference filed an amicus curiae brief over the
past almost three decades addresses the problems identified at the outset. First
is the sporadic "one case at a time" nature of the commentary. When one views
a fuller set of cases in which a Catholic Justice's religious identity might be
thought to make a difference, one sees that the simple stories spun on a one-off
basis are misleading. It is irresponsible to assert, for instance, that Justice
Kennedy voted to uphold the federal partial-birth abortion ban in Gonzales v.
Carhart because he is Catholic without accounting for his votes and reasoning
in Casey or Windsor. Nor can one responsibly assert, for example, that Justice
Thomas votes as he does in abortion cases because he is a Catholic, without
explaining why that religious identity does not change his votes in death-
penalty cases. And so on.
The second problem is the asymmetry in causal attributions. Looking at the
set of cases in which the Bishops' Conference has filed an amicus curiae brief
enables one to see the scope of this problem. Not only are there a number of
cases in which Catholic Justices, despite being Catholic, voted against
outcomes advocated by the Bishops' Conference. There are also many cases in
which the Catholic Justices voted for outcomes advocated by the Bishops'
Conference but in which it is nonetheless difficult to say they did so because of
their Catholicism. The disconnect between the Bishops' Conference and the
Catholic Justices on matters of federal law is most obvious for Catholic Justices
like Justice Brennan and Justice Sotomayor. But there is a disconnect for all of
them to some extent. Even though there have not yet been any cases in which
Chief Justice Roberts has voted against the outcome supported by the Bishops'
Conference in a case which the Conference filed an amicus curiae brief, and the
number of such cases for several of the Justices is small, nobody thinks (or
92. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006); Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2005).
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ought to think) that any of the Catholic Justices' votes in every case line up
with how a hypothetical "Bishops' Justice" would vote.
And this leads to the third problem: inattention to broader legal,
jurisprudential, and ideological commitments. Nobody familiar with the
Justices' respective approaches to the law in any of the areas addressed in the
Bishops' Conference's amicus curiae briefs would be surprised by the Justices'
votes in those cases. And one could not generalize across the Catholic Justices
as a group to identify one "Catholic factor" that they all have in common. This
has been so historically and remains so today.93 The very idea of a hypothetical
"Bishops' Justice" shows the problem with considering Catholic identity apart
from the Justices' broader legal, jurisprudential, and ideological commitments.
We would not know enough to predict how such a Justice would or should vote
on cases that the Bishops' Conference cares about unless we knew more about
such a Justice's broader commitments beyond an affinity for outcomes
consonant with Catholic social teaching.
Perhaps the best evidence demonstrating that unwavering commitment to
Catholic social teaching does not translate directly into legal outcomes are the
Bishops' Conference's briefs themselves. These briefs contain conventional
legal argument rooted firmly within Supreme Court precedent, not extensive
quotations from theological sources. Even the Eighth Amendment briefs, which
set forth the distinctive views of the Catholic Church on capital punishment,
along with many other Christian denominations and non-Christian religions
that joined these briefs, are presented within the framework of existing doctrine
that requires the Court to ascertain evolving standards of decency. 94 When
other filings ask the Court to limit or overrule a precedent, such as Roe v.
Wade, they do so with legal arguments virtually indistinguishable from those
that would be filed by any other group with a similar legal objective.95 And
although emerging from a particular faith tradition, the arguments aspire for
more universal appeal, both before and after filing. It is common for other
religious organizations to join the Bishops' Conference's briefs, and those
briefs are aimed at all the Justices (particularly swing Justices), not just the
Catholics.
An examination of the conventional legal arguments in the Bishops'
Conference's briefs also reveals why it makes sense that the Catholic Justices
could not uniformly support them as a bloc. The briefs do not map well onto
the broader legal, jurisprudential, and ideological commitments of any one of
the Justices. Consider, for instance, the great extent to which the Conference's
amicus curiae briefs in the death penalty cases advance arguments that appeal
93. See Noonan, The Religion of the Justice, supra note 37.
94. See, e.g., Brief of the United States Conference of Catholics Bishops and Other
Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 534
U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
95. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference et al.,
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902).
432 [Vol. 26:411
COMMENTS ON CATHOLICS
to the Justices to make moral judgments, in contrast with the Conference's
amicus curiae briefs in abortion, assisted suicide, and same-sex marriage
cases.96 The Conference's death penalty briefs call on the Justices to resolve
what the briefs describe as "essentially moral questions" involving the death
penalty. 97 These briefs appeal to the expertise and experience developed by the
Bishops' Conference (and the many other religious organizations that joined
the Conference's death penalty briefs) in "working with and studying the
conscience of the human person and related questions of guilt, blame and
punishment."98 By contrast with their death penalty briefs, the Conference's
briefs in abortion and assisted suicide cases contemplate a more restrained role
for the Justices in exercising their moral judgment. That is to be expected, of
course, given the Church's evaluation of the Court's capacity for moral
judgment in these areas.
There is nothing in Catholic teaching that prevents the Bishops'
Conference from seeking greater consonance between American law and
Catholic social teaching at the level of Supreme Court outcomes. But because
there is no Catholic teaching about the meaning of federal law, the Bishops'
Conference does this by opportunistically embracing differing understandings
of the propriety of the Court's exercise of moral judgment in order to make
conventional legal arguments within the differing doctrinal frameworks for the
death penalty, on the one hand, and substantive due process, on the other. One
should not mistake the resulting body of Supreme Court briefs as reflecting an
overall consistent understanding of constitutional law. If individual Justices
were to exhibit as judges the opportunism of the Bishops' Conference as
advocates, they would be open to criticism as bad judges. 99
To state the obvious point that the influence of the Catholic Justices'
religious identity is always filtered through broader legal, jurisprudential, and
ideological commitments is not to deny that Catholic identity matters to how
the Catholic Justices decide cases. But the way in which it does so is deeply
individualized and not susceptible of generalization. It is a matter more fit for
96. Compare, e.g., Brief of the United States Conference of Catholics Bishops and
Other Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roper v.
Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) (death penalty), with Brief Amicus Curiae of
the United States Catholic Conference et al., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902) (abortion), and Brief Amici Curiae of the United
States Catholic Conference et al., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-
110) (assisted suicide), and Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops in Support of Petitioners and Supporting Reversal, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144) (same-sex marriage).
97. See, e.g., Brief of the United States Conference of Catholics Bishops and Other
Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 534
U.S. 551 (2005) (No.03-633).
98. Id.
99. Cf. Bond v. United States No. 12-158, at 3 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (criticizing the opinion for the Court by saying that it "reads likely a really good
lawyer's brief for the wrong side").
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biographers and legal historians. In contrast with the simplistic way in which
the commentary on the Catholic Justices in a case like Gonzales v. Carhart
depicts the influence of Catholicism, the reality is much more complex.
As one example, consider political scientist Frank Colucci's claims about
Justice Kennedy. In his book-length study of Justice Kennedy's output in
constitutional cases, Colucci contends that "Kennedy's rhetoric of liberty and
human dignity" in cases involving school prayer (Lee v. Weisman), the juvenile
death penalty (Roper v. Simmons), and sexual liberty (Lawrence v. Texas)
"appears to be profoundly shaped by his Catholicism."' 00 Colucci bases his
argument on similarities between the language in these opinions and that in
Church documents setting forth Catholic social teaching, such as the Catechism
of the Catholic Church, Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Freedom
(Dignitatis Humanae), the Apostolic Letter by Pope John Paul II on the Dignity
and Vocation of Women (Mulieris Dignitatem), the Address to Women in Pope
Paul VI's Closing Address for Vatican II, and a papal encyclical by Pope John
Paul II (Evangelium Vitae).101 Colucci also finds an influence of various
documents of Catholic social teaching on Justice Kennedy's opinions for the
Court in abortion cases like Gonzales v. Carhart and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. According to Colucci, "[t]he influence of [these] Catholic documents
can be seen most clearly in Kennedy's language in Casey about the mystery of
life, the dignity of women, and the nature of the abortion decision."1 02
The rhetorical similarities between Justice Kennedy's opinions and these
Church documents are indeed noteworthy. But it does not follow, of course,
that Justice Kennedy voted as he did in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
Gonzales v. Carhart, Lee v. Weisman, Roper v. Simmons, or Lawrence v. Texas
because he is Catholic. Consider the two cases of this group to which Catholic
social teaching speaks most directly: Casey and Roper. Of these two, Roper is
consistent with Catholic social teaching at the level of outcome, while Casey is
fundamentally incompatible.
It is curious that Justice Kennedy apparently thought it worthwhile to
model some of his language in these cases on Church documents. But if he
intended to implement Catholic social teaching through his votes, Justice
Kennedy did not do a very good job. Casey provides as good an example as any
of the coupling of rhetorical similarity with substantive divergence. The Casey
plurality treats the "mystery of life" as something that an individual woman, as
a subjective decision maker, creates and gives meaning to through her choice;
Mulieris Dignitatem, by contrast, treats the "mystery of life, as it develops in
the womb" as a source of meaning that itself gives rise to acceptance and love,
100. FRANK J. CoLucci, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND
NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 31 (2009).
101. See id. at 31-33, 71-73. Although Colucci refers generically to the documents with
rhetorical similarities to Justice Kennedy's opinions as post-Vatican II pronouncements, one
of the most central documents, Dignitatis Humanae, was not issued after Vatican II. rather,
Dignitatis Humanae was Vatican II's pronouncement on religious liberty.
102. Id. at 72.
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"an attitude towards human beings-not only towards her own child, but every
human being-which marks the woman's personality."10 3 Indeed, Kennedy's
co-authorship of "the joint opinion in Casey, with its famous 'sweet mystery of
life' passage" is a significant data point for those skeptical of the idea that
Justice Kennedy is "a Catholic jurist."1 04
Or consider Justice Kennedy's views on same-sex marriage. There is little
in Catholic social teaching that would predictably yield something like his
opinion for the Court in United States v. Windsor. And if Windsor was a sign of
things to come regarding the recognition of a new constitutional right to same-
sex marriage (as most lower courts took it to be and as it proved to be as this
volume went to print), then the distance between Catholic social teaching and
Justice Kennedy's constitutional corpus juris is even bigger.
The point here is limited: to highlight some difficulties accounting for the
multifarious ways in which any one Justice may be influenced in some way by
his or her beliefs as a Catholic. There is much more that one could say about
Justice Kennedy alone, and biographers and legal historians writing about other
Justices could generate similar reflections for those Justices. It would be
surprising, though, if one were to end up finding similar narratives for any of
the individual Catholic Justices. And this, in the end, is the primary
contribution made by insisting on thinking about the full set of cases in which
the Bishops' Conference has filed amicus briefs. Instead of trading one
simplistic approach for another, this Article insists on the complexity of
Catholic influence.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and others are far from having a general descriptive account of
how the Catholic Justices' religious background has interacted with their role
fidelity as Supreme Court Justices. But that may be because a general
descriptive account is not possible. The problematic type of commentary that
has prompted this examination of the Justices' votes in cases in which the
Bishops' Conference has filed an amicus brief will nevertheless continue. But
the problems that plague this commentary are better appreciated and more
easily addressed when one appreciates the full breadth of cases in which the
Bishops' Conference has filed amicus briefs. By opening up critical
consideration of the Catholic Justices through the lens of this overlooked
resource, this Article raises more questions than it answers. But the first step
toward getting better answers is to ask better questions.
103. JOHN PAUL II, MULIERIS DIGNITATEM T 18.6 (1988).
104. See Mark Movsesian, Anthony Kennedy: Catholic Jurist?, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 28,
2013), http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2013/03/anthony-kennedy-catholic-
jurist.
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